We develop a fairly general and tractable model of investment when workers can invest in multiple skills and different jobs put different weights on those skills. In addition to expected findings such as that younger workers are more likely than older workers to respond to a demand shock by investing in skills whose value unexpectedly increases, we derive some less obvious results. Credit constraints may affect investment even when they do not bind it equilibrium. If there are mobility costs, firms will generally have an incentive to invest in some of their workers' skills even when there are a large number of similar competitors, and, in equilibrium, there can be overinvestment in all skills. Worker skill accumulation resembles learning by doing even in its absence. We demonstrate how the model can be simulated to show the effect of a shock to the price of individual skills. We develop a fairly general and tractable model of investment when workers can invest in multiple skills and di¤erent jobs put di¤erent weights on those skills. In addition to expected …ndings such as that younger workers are more likely than older workers to respond to a demand shock by investing in skills whose value unexpectedly increases, we derive some less obvious results. Credit constraints may a¤ect investment even when they do not bind it equilibrium. If there are mobility costs, …rms will generally have an incentive to invest in some of their workers'skills even when there are a large number of similar competitors, and, in equilibrium, there can be overinvestment in all skills. Worker skill accumulation resembles learning by doing even in its absence.
Introduction
For roughly …ve decades, the Ben-Porath (1967) model has justi…ably served as the workhorse model of investment in homogeneous general human capital over the lifetime. But labor economists increasingly rely on models of multiple skills and tasks to understand earnings variation across individuals and over the lifetime. The Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) classi…cation of skills as manual and cognitive and tasks as routine and non-routine plays a key role in much of the literature on recent changes in the distribution of earnings. Similarly, 1 the work of Heckman and coauthors (e.g. Cunha and Heckman 2008) focuses on the dynamics of investment in cognitive and noncognitive skills, particularly prior to labor market entry. Urzua and Prada (forthcoming) …nd that also accounting for mechanical ability greatly a¤ects how we should think about investment in education. Bowlus, Mori and Robinson (forthcoming) explore how skill use evolves over the lifecycle. Altonji (2010) , in particular, emphasizes the need for a research agenda that recognizes that skill is multidimensional and that jobs di¤er in their requirements.
This paper is intended to contribute to that agenda. It draws heavily on the insights of Lazear (2009) in viewing jobs as putting linear weights on skills but drops the assumption that the sum of the weights must be one. We make three main contributions:
1. We develop a relatively tractable model of post-labor market entry job choice and investment in skills. In its most abstract form, it is very ‡exible; workers may generalize or specialize over their lifetimes. But we parallel limited general results with an example that permits stronger conclusions and could be used for calibration. 2. We show that the comparative statics of the model are consistent with what we expect from such a model. Workers who have relatively more of one skill choose jobs that put more weight on that skill. Workers with lower discount rates and longer remaining lifetimes will tend to invest more heavily in skills that unexpectedly become more valuable. 3. We also provide some results that are, at least to us, to varying degrees surprising:
(a) The process of skill investment and job choice generates persistence even if there is no learning by doing; workers always continue to invest in any skill they already have although not necessarily su¢ ciently to o¤set depreciation. (b) Credit constraints can in ‡uence investment even when in equilibrium they do not appear to be binding. (c) Even when all skills are completely general in the sense that there is an arbitrarily large number of jobs requiring similar skills, in the presence of mobility costs and …rm bargaining power, …rms generally have an incentive to invest in some, but not all, skills used in the job. (d) In equilibrium, between them, the worker and …rm may overinvest in every skill.
This happens quite generally with only two skills and for a class of feasible job sets regardless of the number of skills. We begin with a simple two-skill example with two periods. We then generalize the twoperiod model and derive a number of analytic results. We conclude by examining continuous time where we generally rely on a speci…c functional form and numeric solutions. The continuous-time example considers the case of individuals who enter the market with equal stocks of three skills. Initially it is optimal to invest most heavily in skill 2 and least in skill 3. Workers are then hit with a shock which would be mildly positive for those workers if it arrived just when they enter the market but which increases the value of skill 3 and reduces the value of skill 2. Not surprisingly, older workers continue in jobs that weight skill two heavily despite the adverse shock. Middle-aged workers partially adjust by gradually increasing their stock of skill 1 and shift to skill 1-intensive jobs while relatively younger workers shift to skill 3. Younger workers have a longer lifetime to exploit their skills over, and so most investment is undertaken when young. Thus, it is (perhaps surprisingly) only the very youngest workers who bene…t from the shock.
A Simple Example
The worker begins period 0 endowed with skill levels S 1 0 and S 2 0: We treat premarket investment as exogenous. We do, however, assume that the worker can arrive in the labor market with something other than the skills that are optimal for her. This may be due to uncertainty; the value of skills in the future may be unknown, and the worker or those investing in her may wish to diversify against this uncertainty. Schooling may be insu¢ ciently individualized or premarket skill investment may re ‡ect goals other than maximizing market earnings.
A job J is a vector of non-negative weights on the worker's skills. At job J, she produces J 1 S 1 + J 2 S 2 . The worker chooses from a set of jobs J given by (a 1 J 1 ) + (a 2 J 2 ) 1
with a 1 > 0; a 2 > 0 and > 1. Optimal choice implies a job on the boundary of J where (1) holds with equality. Such a job that only uses one skill puts a weight of 1=a i on it. When = 2 and a 1 = a 2 = 1; the boundary is the unit quarter circle in the positive quadrant; there, a job using both skills equally puts a weight of p :5 on each. As ! 1; the trade-o¤ between the skills -given by the northeast boundary -tends to a straight line. The limit is thus the (excluded) case where workers always choose to use only one skill. As ! 1, the job set becomes a square, and it is thus disadvantageous to move away from using both skills equally; in e¤ect there is only one skill.
Job Choice
In order for the model to be sensible and helpful, we need to allow for individual heterogeneity. We would not want the optimal skill vector to be the same for everyone. At the same time, we do not wish to make the set of available jobs individual-speci…c. Consequently, we introduce a weighting matrix which allows the value of skills within a job to vary both over time and across individuals. Various basketball skills are less valuable for an unusually short worker than for one who is unusually tall. Similarly, knowing how to shoe horses is a skill that has declined in value even though the job persists.
A worker who chooses job J earns 1 J 1 + 2 J 2 : She therefore maximizes
This problem has the same solution as
where A i = i =a i and has the useful interpretation that A i is the maximum weight on skill i in any job. We will show a similar result holds in general and will focus on this formulation throughout the paper. Changes in A can be thought of capturing changes over time in the value of a skill or di¤erences in quality of that skill across individuals.
Maximizing gives the …rst-order conditions
along with the constraint. Solving the …rst-order conditions, we have
Note that dJ i =dS i > 0; the higher a worker's skill, the more weight the job she chooses puts on it. Finally, using (5), we get the value of the skill endowment
Note that this resembles a CES production function except that the exterior exponent is less than 1 rather than greater than or equal to 1: This is signi…cant because it means that the function is convex rather than concave -as a skill increases, production would increase linearly if the job remained constant; however, the worker re-optimizes and increases the weight on that skill. 4
Investment
We now extend the example to two periods and allow the worker to invest in skills following production in period 0, increasing them by I at cost
Note that since skill typically has no natural scale, we can normalize the coe¢ cients on I i rather than writing i I i : Of course, this normalization will a¤ect S i and A i , but this simpli…es the problem. Following the investment choice the worker again chooses a job, so that the worker's lifetime problem is to maximize the Lagrangian
where J 0 and J 1 are the jobs in periods 0 and 1, is the discount factor and i is the rate at which skill i does not depreciate (1 minus the depreciation rate) between periods 0 and 1. It should be apparent that the problem is separable. First period job choice and investment do not depend on each other. Separating investment and second-period job choice and using the formula for V from (6) to simplify it, we get the maximand
which yields the …rst-order conditions for I:
Claim 1 Investment in skill i is increasing in the quantity of the skill carried forward from the previous period. That is
Proof. Apply the implicit function theorem. Since V is convex, its second derivative with respect to S i is positive while the second derivative of (10) with respect to I i is negative by the second-order conditions. Thus skill builds on itself. A worker who has a high level of skill chooses a job that makes greater use of that skill. Knowing that she will be in a similar job next period, the worker chooses to invest more in the type of skill that the worker uses. In a manner somewhat analogous to Lazear (2009) , workers invest in skills that make them particularly good at the type of job they currently occupy even though there is no learning by doing.
Claim 1 also implies that workers invest less in skills that depreciate more rapidly. Note that this occurs even though the investment itself does not depreciate. Instead, because the skill depreciates, workers know they will choose a job that makes less use of it.
Somewhat informally, we can view workers with higher values of as being 'younger'in the sense that they put more weight on the future. It is evident from (10) that investment is increasing in .
All of the results in this subsection carry over to the general two-period model.
Credit Constraints
For the remainder of the example, it is convenient to set i = 1 = ; i.e. there is no depreciation or discounting. Heretofore we have assumed that the worker is free to invest as much as she wants. In contrast, in Ben-Porath workers can only invest up to their current production. Restrictions on the worker's ability to invest can be used to make our model more closely resemble Ben-Porath's.
More signi…cantly, in our model, such constraints can have important e¤ects even when they appear not to bind. Consider the following example. As ! 1; the worker chooses a job that specializes in whichever skill she has in greater supply. So she either maximizes A 1 (S 1 + I 1 ) I 1 or its equivalent for I 2 : After maximizing and substituting, she compares
with its equivalent for S 2 : Normalize A 1 to 1 and let = 2; S 1 = 2 and S 2 = 0: She will be indi¤erent between investing in the two skills if A 2 = 3: But if she invests in skill 1; she will set I 1 to :5 at a cost of .25. If she invests in skill 2, she will choose I 2 = 1:5 at a cost of 2.25, making a net wage of 2.25 in both cases. However, if she is constrained to spend less than 2.25, she will strictly prefer to invest in skill 1: Provided that the constraint exceeds .25, the constraint is not binding even though it eliminates her indi¤erence. By continuity, there are values of > 1, A 2 > 3 and the constraint such that if unconstrained, she would strictly prefer to invest in skill 2 but if constrained invests in skill 1 while spending less than the constraint. That is, although production at individual jobs is linear, job choice produces a convex skill value function, and thereby we can have a non-binding but choice-altering resource constraint. In the general model, we provide su¢ cient conditions for this to occur.
Mobility Costs and Firm Investment in General Human Capital
Since Becker (1971) economists have understood that workers should pay for their general training. Yet …rms appear to pay for their workers to acquire general skills. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) argue convincingly that a …xed mobility cost is insu¢ cient to overturn this result. They argue that the …rm must be able to capture some of the worker's increased productivity. In Lazear (2009) , …rms pay for general skills because they have some monopsony power.
In the example here, we show that in our model a …xed mobility cost combined with some …rm bargaining power is su¢ cient for the …rm to invest in one of the two skills provided that the mobility cost is su¢ cient to prevent mobility in equilibrium. Furthermore, the worker overinvests in one skill in order to improve her bargaining position while the …rm overinvests in the other in order to deter the worker from overinvesting quite so much.
To …x ideas, consider the case where
If the …rm can commit to invest in the worker' s skills, this ine¢ ciency can be partially blunted. Suppose that …rms can make period-0 o¤ers that include some provision of skill investment e I. The …rm incurs a cost for this investment C( e I), and the worker can invest further so that her total investment is I, by expending C(I) C( e I). As the worker has an ine¢ ciently high desired level of investment in skill 2, the …rm will want to a¤ect that level by committing to a level of investment in skill 1 beyond what the worker would choose on her own, . By using the investment FOCs, we can show that the worker will respond to a …rm investment e I 1 > 1 3
; e I 2 = 0 by choosing
The o¤er from each …rm in period 0 will therefore maximize total worker production subject to this constraint, so that the worker chooses the o¤er maximizing her ex-ante payo¤. The job choice ends up being J [:9; :435] T and the total investment I = [:567; :621] T for a total payo¤ of 2:144. Thus, …rms'ability to commit to investing in the worker reduces the ine¢ ciency.
Notice that the investment in skill 1 o¤ered by the …rm, :567, is greater than the worker would ever choose in the absence of the incentive problem. This is because investment in skill 1 reduces the worker's incentive to invest in skill 2. Suppose instead that the …rm merely committed to investment in skill 1 at the optimal level for production at the current job. Then, further skill investment in skill 1 would result in only a second-order loss of net production at the incumbent …rm, but the gain in net production by reducing incentives to invest in skill 2 is …rst-order as the worker's investment level in skill 2 is above that which would satisfy the FOC of net production at the current …rm. In other words, the …rm commits to an ine¢ ciently high level of investment in skill 1 in order to dampen the worker's ine¢ ciently high level of investment in skill 2, as the two are seen by the worker as substitutes. The end result is overinvestment in both skills given the worker's job, but for di¤erent reasons.
The Two-Period Model
In this section we generalize the basic two-period model with no uncertainty. We reproduce the principal results from the example. In section 4, we derive su¢ cient conditions for the credit constraint and overinvestment results. That section introduces the functional form we rely on for the continuous time section. Readers who are not interested in the technical details of the general two-period model can skip to section 4.
There exist N di¤erent skills. A worker is endowed with a skill vector S 0 1 so that her level of ability in skill n is S n . We will discuss investment shortly, but …rst consider a worker with a …xed vector of skills. The worker will choose a job from J R N + , the job set. The job set represents the collection of production technologies at di¤erent jobs, in the form of the set of available skill weight vectors from which the worker can choose. This set is nonempty, strictly convex, compact and can be described in terms of a strictly convex, smooth function F : R N ! R and the positive orthant so that J fJ 2 R N + jF (J) 0g. A worker with skill vector S at job J receives a wage
where A is a diagonal matrix. It may be useful to think of A as allowing us to capture shifts over time or across individuals in the value of a skill in all jobs. We can scale A and J so that A i can be interpreted as the maximum weight that any job puts on skill i. We further assume that r 2 F (J) is positive de…nite when rF (J) >> 0. Finally, if some
In other words, if there is a job that does not use a skill, then there are jobs that put some weight on that skill, without reducing the weight on the other skills much. This will ensure the worker will choose a job that uses, at least a little, every skill she possesses. The job set therefore tells us how di¤erent skills can be combined to produce.
Single job selection
A worker who must choose a job from J to maximize her wage will solve the constrained program
We can form the associated Lagrangian
When S 6 = 0, this has a unique (from strict convexity) solution satisfying
That such a point is a maximizer also follows from the strict convexity of F . Furthermore, since each job has linear skills weights, J ( ) is homogeneous of degree 0; doubling all of a worker's skills does not change her choice of job.
Relation to skill endowment
As noted, when S >> 0, the …rst order condition and our assumptions guarantee that J >> 0: the worker puts at least some weight on all skills she possesses. We show now, as is quite intuitive, that this is a general result; the worker puts more weight on a skill when she has a higher endowment of that skill.
Proposition 1
The weight that the optimal job places on a skill is increasing in that skill:
Proof. see appendix for all remaining proofs. Therefore, as a worker's particular skill grows, she will choose a job that puts more weight on it.
The value the worker attains with skills S is V (S) = (AJ (S))
T S. The Envelope Theorem tells us that rV (S) = AJ (S). From this and (17) we can see that the value is strictly convex in any particular skill. As her ith skill improves, the worker not only gains by becoming linearly better at her old job, but also gains by selecting jobs that increasingly involve this improved skill.
Investment
We now assume the worker lives two periods, chooses a job from J for each (denoted J 0 and J 1 ) and also has a chance to invest in the …rst period, with the investment increasing her skills in the second period. She will discount payo¤s in the second period to the …rst by a factor of . Her skills will evolve between the two periods by way of an N N diagonal, positive de…nite non-depreciation matrix I N N and an investment vector I.
2 Starting with skills S, the worker will have a skill vector S 0 = S + I in the second period. That is, i is the part of the endowment in skill i that does not depreciate by period 1 due to aging. The rate of depreciation may di¤er among skills.
On the other hand, the worker chooses the investment I and pays C(I) at the time of the investment. We impose restrictions to ensure that workers always want to invest at least a little in any skill used on the job they plan to choose, that investment is …nite and that we can use standard calculus. Formally, we assume that C : R N + ! R + is twice-di¤erentiable, strictly increasing in each dimension of I, C(0) = 0; rC(0) = 0, and r 2 C(I) is diagonal and positive de…nite on R N ++ . We also assume that @C(I)=@I i is unbounded above. The worker solves the problem
For this problem, we form the Lagrangian
Note that J t corresponds to the vector (J t1 ; J t2 ) T in the example in Section 2.
Clearly, the part related to J 0 is entirely separable from the rest and follows the discussion of job choice with exogenous skills above. The rest of the problem becomes
The Lagrangian (L 1 ) is solved with the …rst order conditions
and the negative semi-de…nite (non-bordered) Hessian, in blocks,
Investment and Skill Persistence
One of the striking implications of the model is that prior investment in skills tends to make skills persistent. We show …rst that the worker will never completely abandon investment in a skill that she has already. Then we show that investment in a skill is weakly increasing in the level of that skill. In e¤ect, we have a dynamic that looks very much like learning-bydoing. A worker who has a high level of some skill knows that, despite some depreciation, she will have a lot of it next period as well. And since she will have a lot next period, she will choose a job that will put a lot of weight on that skill as well. But this makes it valuable to invest even more in the skill.
Proposition 2 A worker always continues to invest in any skill she already possesses:
As all skills the worker has any initial ability with will be given weight in period 1, the worker is incentivized to invest a positive amount in them as the marginal cost of doing so is 0 at an investment of 0. This does not imply that all skills improve; depreciation can dominate investment.
We are not guaranteed a unique solution to the maximization problem, although we will have it in most generic cases. We assume a unique solution for the remainder of the twoperiod model and also that S >> 0 so that we have an interior solution, i.e. J 1 >> 0; I >>
Then we have
Proposition 3 Investment is weakly increasing in the existing endowment of a skill:
That is to say, workers invest in skills at which they are already good. This is produced by the fact that costs to improve a skill do not depend on that skill's previous level. This is an expression of specialization persistence. Highly skilled, specialized workers will take a secondperiod job that is largely determined by their endowment, and are therefore incentivized to invest in a way that re ‡ects their initial specialization.
Using (17) and the fact the J 0 -part of (P 01 ) is identical to (P 0 ), we also have
In other words, both skill investment and the …rst job's skill use are correlated with the initial endowment. This occurs despite the fact that investment costs do not depend on the …rst job. Therefore, what appears as learning-by-doing may instead simply be the product of aligned incentives. Skill depreciation and initial skills S enter the problem multiplicatively and identically outside of …rst-period job choice which is in turn entirely separable from the rest of the problem. As a consequence, the e¤ects of i on investment and second period job choice are symmetric to those of S i ; we have
This is signi…cant. Despite the fact that the new investment will not depreciate by the time it is used in production, the fact that initial ability in that skill will have, means it is less worthwhile to invest in it -no one wants to 'run to stay in place'. This can simply be understood by the fact that @ 2 V (S)=(@S i ) 2 = @J i (S)=@S i > 0; the second-period value of skills is convex in each argument, so increasing depreciation reduces a skill's marginal value.
Age
Although the model does not explicitly account for age, we can alter to change the 'length' of the second period. This proportionately raises the value of both S and I. The total expenditure on investment will increase with the remaining time.
Proposition 4 Let > 0 , I be a solution to the problem with discount factor and I 0 be a solution to the problem with discount factor 0 . Then C(I ) > C(I 0 ).
Therefore, younger workers spend more on investment, as is intuitive. However, this result only addresses total investment costs. It does not necessarily mean that investment in any particular individual skill will increase in age. This is illustrated by the following example.
Convex example. Take N = 2, = I with C(I) = . Fixing C(I), solving for I 2 and taking a second derivative of the objective w.r.t. I 1 , the result is positive for all I 1 > 0. Therefore, for any …xed amount of spending, corner solutions are optimal; thus, we need only examine corner solutions. For = :5 p 3, the solution is I = (:75; 0) while for = p 2, the solution is I = (0; 2 p 2); total investment costs are :25 p 3 and 3 respectively. Therefore, in this example, the younger worker will spend more on skill investment overall, but less on skill 1 in particular. The intuition here is as follows: investment costs are initially lower for skill 1, but rise more sharply. A worker with insu¢ cient time to exploit her skills after investment will therefore want to make a small total investment, and skill 1 is better suited for that; by contrast, a worker with a higher will wish to invest more in total, and skill 2 is better suited for large investments.
The Diagonal Form Case
We now work with a speci…c functional form both to address questions of specialization and generalization, and to have a ‡exible but workable framework for continuous time. To do this, we will assume F 1 and C are diagonal forms. We will also derive conditions under which there is overinvestment in all skills in this case and conditions under which ex ante a credit constraint is binding even though it appears not to be ex post.
Setup
We will be working with job sets which share the form
with > 1. The job-choice problem with skills S is therefore max J2R N + J T S subject to (25).
Recall that we can always renormalize the job and that therefore the assumption that the coe¢ cient on J i is 1 is without loss of generality. A diagonal form for F + 1 implies a spherical shape; this means that skills are interrelated in the same ways, so that we can ignore questions of complementarity versus substitutability and focus on questions of specialization versus generalization. The cost function we will be using is simply a diagonal form with exponent > 1 and unit coe¢ cients.
Solution
Solving for the …rst period job choice, we obtain
The investment problem is
5 Unit coe¢ cients are used without loss of generality; using diagonal K as cost coe¢ cients, endowment S with productivity A would generate the same job choices, production and investment costs as unit cost coe¢ cients, endowment K 1 S and productivity K 1 A. As we are not in the business of de…ning an absolute notion of a unit of skill, we allow ourselves this normalization.
Swapping S for S + I we can use (27) to write (29) as
From there, we can compute the …rst order condition with respect to I i as
Corner solutions with I i = 0 require S i = 0 as usual, but here it is also necessary that
( 1)( 1) 1 for them to exist. 
Specialization and Generalization
So far we have analyzed period 1 job selection but, as that problem is separable from period 0 job selection, we have not examined the relation between the two. In this subsection, we examine the conditions under which workers generalize or specialize in their skill set. We restrict ourselves to the case where = I for some < 1 so skills depreciate at the same relative rate 1 . In this case, a single measure of the problem's convexity can deliver many results simultaneously.
The ratio of the elasticity of the relative marginal costs to the elasticity of the of the relative marginal products, ( 1)( 1), tells us how fast costs grow as we move away from balanced investment, relative to how production grows. If ( 1)( 1) > 1, costs grow too fast for specialization to occur, and the worker generalizes. If, on the other hand, ( 1)( 1) < 1, the costs grow too slow relative to the gains from job selection, so the worker will specialize. We show the problem in the generalization case is unique.
Proposition 5 When ( 1)( 1) 1 and S 6 = 0 the global maximizer of (31) is unique. Now, we can examine the evolution of job choice in the generalization world. When
( 1)( 1) > 1, the optimal second-period job when S = 0 de…nes an attractor for job weight ratios. When the ratio of the weights assigned to two skills in the …rst period is not the same as in the S=0 problem, the following period the ratios of skill weights will be closer to those when S = 0. We regard this as generalization -regardless of their initial skill endowments, all workers in such a model move towards a common, non-extreme skill set.
Credit Constraints and Relation to the Ben-Porath Model
Other than addressing the multiplicity of skills, our model so far di¤ers from the standard Ben-Porath model in two ways. First, it is set in discrete time. This is unimportant. Later in the paper, we explore the diagonal version of the model in continuous time. The second is that the standard presentation of the Ben-Porath model assumes that investment takes the form of foregone production. Workers devote a fraction of their time to investing. In contrast, we treat investment as a cost. Workers can purchase skills.
For the most part this distinction is unimportant and largely a matter of convenience. We can think of someone who is capable of earning $x and chooses to invest $y as foregoing a proportion y=x of her income. Where it becomes important is when the optimal y > x: In some ways this can be resolved by simply imposing the additional constraint that C (I ) J T 0 S which would only slightly complicate the model. However, we show in this section that a constraint can work di¤erently than it does in the Ben-Porath model. In that model, when the constraint binds, the individual spends all of her resources on investment, which is typically interpreted as being engaged in full-time schooling. We show here that when there are multiple skills, this conclusion is no longer valid. The skill value function V is weakly convex, with the convexity inequality strict for all but parallel skill vectors. As a consequence, on R N ++ , V ( ) is strictly convex in each component of S, despite the fact that any individual job's production function is linear. This can make the investment problem non-convex, and therefore produce solutions a¤ected by the constraint, but without the constraint binding with equality. We derive su¢ cient conditions for this to be true.
In a world of specialization, when skill productivity varies su¢ ciently, there are always endowments and budget constraints such that the budget constraint does not bind with equality but a¤ects the optimum. Let I c ( ) denote the function mapping the endowment S into optimal investment when the constraint is c.
Proposition 7 If
( 1)( 1) < 1 and A 1 < max i A i =: A 2 such that
7 then 9S; c : C(I c (S)) < c and C(I (S)) > c.
The basic intuition can be seen in Figure 1 which shows, in an example, how the budget constraint a¤ects both total investment and the particular skills invested in. As the worker is endowed with much skill 1, for low values of the constraint he simply continues investing in that skill. It's not worth investing in skill 1 for long, as it's productivity is mediocre, so investment is constant when c 2 [:25; 1]. However, once the constraint is greater than 1 the worker specializes heavily in skill 2, and the constraint once again binds until c = 4. Beyond that, further investment is ine¢ cient, and relaxing the constraint further has no e¤ect on net output. 
Mobility Costs and Overinvestment
Consider again the problem that arises when …rms can o¤er wages to the worker and mobility costs give the incumbent …rm local monopsony power. Once again, suppose that to counteract the worker's ine¢ cient investment incentives, the …rm may commit to provide some skill investment as part of the period 0 job o¤er. We now derive a su¢ cient condition for overinvestment in all skills if mobility costs are su¢ cient to prevent mobility in equilibrium. It turns out that this is always true provided that the worker would move in the absence of the mobility cost and that the condition for workers to generalize over their lifetime is satis…ed.
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Let the mobility cost be m. Denote the worker's investment best response function mapping the …rm's investment commitment to total investment by I W ( ). Note that I W refers to the combined investment regardless of whether carried out by the …rm or worker.
Proposition 8 Let C and F + 1 be diagonal forms with ( 1)( 1) > 1. Suppose the worker with skill endowment S >> 0 does not move in period 1, but would absent the mobility cost. Then the optimal contract (J; I F ; w 0 ) satis…es
The intuition for this result is simple: to the worker, investments in di¤erent skills are substitutes. The worker's incentives are to overinvest in certain skills relative to the current job's weights in order to improve the outside option for bargaining purposes. Then, by increasing investment in other skills -those not overinvested in -the …rm can dampen the worker's incentives. The …rm wants to commit to overinvest in these counterweight-skills, as at the appropriate level of investment for the current job, the direct e¤ect on net production has a zero FOC (by de…nition), but the e¢ ciency gain from reducing excessive investment elsewhere is a …rst-order e¤ect.
Continuous Time
We now wish to move the model to continuous time. We will keep the Diagonal Form structure in doing so, and retain much of the relevant intuition.
Setup
The problem is now de…ned over an interval in continuous time [0; T ], which is discounted at a rate r. The worker possesses skills S(t) at time t; the productivity matrix is A and the worker chooses jobs J(t) from the job set J = fJ 2 R N + j P i J i 1g so that her timet instantaneous production is J(t)
T AS(t). Skills depreciate at relative rates given by the diagonal matrix D := I , counterbalanced by investment I(t), so that
However, investment is costly, with time-t instantaneous cost C(I(t)) = P i I i (t) -the diagonal form. Endowed with initial skills S 0 , the worker therefore seeks to maximize her lifetime utility by solving
The worker chooses I(t) and J(t) optimally. However, as J does not in ‡uence the state variable, it is chosen according to (27) . Thus, we can bypass job selection for the moment and reduce the problem to
We therefore construct the Hamiltonian
The solution is given by the i equations
along with the motion equations for skills
the initial condition S(0) = S 0 , and the transversality condition I(T ) = 0.
Ben-Porath Case
In the special case where all skills grow at the same rate, the …rst term in (43) can be replaced with K i , a skill-speci…c term that is constant over time. In this case the solution to (43) becomes
Note that, as required for constant K i ; the ratio of investment in any two skills is constant. Figure 2 graphs an example of this 'Ben-Porath case'. The worker enters the market with twice as many units of skill 1 as of skill 2. Although the values of and are chosen so that there is a tendency to generalize skills, this is exactly o¤set by the greater initial endowment of skill 1 and the higher productivity of skill 1 for the worker so that the worker's investment maintains the 2 : 1 ratio of skill 1 to skill 2. Net output (the wage) shows the classic hump-shaped pattern of the Ben-Porath model and peaks later than gross output. Since investment reaches 0 at exactly time T , this is the point at which the two are equal.
Unlike in the Ben-Porath model, we allow for investment in excess of production. In this and the other examples given, production net of investment starts out negative, meaning the worker is borrowing to …nance the early stages of her skill investment.
Jobs and Skills Over the Lifecycle
It is generally not possible to obtain a closed form solution for (43). We can, however, solve the system numerically for given values of A; D; r and S 0 . To demonstrate the potential usefulness of this approach, we present a scenario that we …nd particularly interesting.
The scenario has three skills which we refer to as skills 1, 2 and 3, but the reader may think of them as nonroutine manual, routine cognitive and nonroutine cognitive. Our chief example considers a worker subject to an unanticipated shock that increases the value of nonroutine cognitive skills while also decreasing the value of routine cognitive tasks. In reality, combinations of skills may have di¤ering degrees of synergy. Nevertheless, we think even the simple example using diagonal form, which treats skills complementarity symmetrically, provides some useful insights. We consider an individual who arrives in the labor market with 10 units of each skill. Initially the second skill is the most valuable (A 2 = 1:2); the …rst lies in the middle (A 1 = 1:13) and the third skill is the least valuable (A 3 = :8) to the worker. The worker is assumed to be in the labor force for forty years. We consider an unanticipated shock that occurs in either the worker's 10th, 20th or 30th year (and for some purposes the 35th year) in the market. The shock reduces A 2 to :8 and increases A 3 to 1:25 while leaving A 1 at 1:13: If workers typically arrive in the market with similar amounts of skills 2 and 3, the shock represents a mild form of positive shock for the youngest workers. Figure 3 shows the path of the three skill weights for the individual if she experiences no shock and at 10, 20 or 30 years of experience. The top left corner shows the baseline with no shock. Absent the shock, the worker specializes in skill 2.
Continuing clockwise, we see that if the shock arrives when she has thirty years experience, she immediately mechanically (since A 2 falls) …nds herself a job that puts less weight on skill 2. Comparing the two panels, it is also evident that she increases her net investment in skills 1 and 3 relative to her net investment in skill 2 once the shock hits since the weights Figure 3 : Job Weights by Experience by Timing of Shock on the former now grow rather than shrink. In fact, most of the adjustment can be shown to come from reduced investment in skill 2 rather than increased investment in the other skills. This can be seen most clearly in Figure 4 which shows the stocks of skills at each point in time. In the end, she adjusts very little. She continues to work in jobs that focus on the skill in which she has accumulated a large stock even though the value of that stock has fallen by about one third.
A shock at twenty years of experience has a more noticeable e¤ect on shifting the job weights. But because her stock of skill 3 has depreciated so much over twenty years, by the end of her career, she shifts towards a job that places the most weight on skill 1. Much, but not all, of the increased weight on skill 3 re ‡ects the greatly increased value of that skill in all jobs rather than a very large shift towards investment in skill 3.
Only when the shock arrives su¢ ciently early in her career does she adjust by investing much more heavily in skill 3 and somewhat more in skill 1 so that ten years after the shock, she works in a job that places the greatest weight on skill 3. Figure 5 shows net output over time. As the worker has invested most heavily in a skill 23 Figure 4 : Skill Levels by Experience by Timing of Shock whose value is reduced, the worker su¤ers an immediate adverse shock to net output. The magnitude of the shock will depend largely on how much of skill 2 she has accumulated relative to skill 3. As a consequence, the individual shocked at 10 years of experience su¤ers an earlier but smaller output shock. Compared to a similar person su¤ering a shock at 20 years of experience, she has higher output at nearly every later experience level. When the shock hits the similar person at 30 years, the one shocked at 10 years has already recovered su¢ ciently to have higher net output. The person shocked at 20 years of experience fares almost as badly in the last 30 years of work as the person shocked at 30 years. More generally, in this example in which the shock is in a sense positive, a worker who begins her career just as the shock hits will bene…t. One who ends her career just as the shock hits will be una¤ected. By continuity there will be a range of low experience levels at which the e¤ect of the shock will be positive. We expect, but have not shown, that the e¤ect of the shock is U-shaped.
We can broaden this discussion to ask who is most adversely a¤ected by the shock. The easiest way to answer this question is by comparing the present value of net output. In Figure 5 : Net Output and Experience by Timing of Shock our example, this value is highest for the person who is never shocked and decreases as the timing of the shock moves to 35 to 30 to 20 to 10 years of experience. Since we know that a shock at 0 years of experience would have a positive e¤ect, the signi…cant point is that a positive shock can have a negative e¤ect for a very long time. In 5, the individual shocked at 10 years of experience never returns to the net output level that she would have reached in the absence of a shock.
At the same time, the PDV of net output may be a misleading measure of how adversely the worker is a¤ected. It requires that utility be linear in income. If workers are risk averse and smooth consumption over their lifetimes, then a worker subjected to an unanticipated negative shock will have lower lifetime utility than one with the same PDV of net output but who does not experience an unanticipated shock, since the latter, but not the former, can fully smooth consumption.
If the workers in our sample smooth consumption over their lifetimes, very young workers will have accumulated less debt than somewhat older workers while workers nearing retirement will have accumulated more retirement savings than those somewhat further from retirement. Therefore, very young workers and those nearing retirement do not need to reduce the ‡ow of consumption by as much as someone in between. We continue our example by assuming that people live for another 20 years following retirement and smooth their consumption perfectly except for the e¤ect of the unanticipated shock. Here we …nd that a worker shocked at 20 years of experience must reduce her consumption by almost half (47 percent) relative to what she had anticipated. In contrast, workers shocked at 10 and 30 years of experience must reduce their consumption by 35 percent and 36 percent.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the example is the length of time for which an ultimately positive shock can be negative. The same worker who spends her entire career after the shock will earn 6.3 percent more over her lifetime than if she …nished her career before the shock hit. Yet even a worker who was only …ve years into her career never recovers from the shock and su¤ers a decline of about one-third in future consumption. This is because skill investment is extremely front-loaded to allow for longer exploitation time, so the loss is great even when the shock hits early. While ours is an example, not a calibration exercise, we …nd this duration and magnitude of the e¤ect striking.
Discussion and Conclusion
We believe that our model provides both qualitative and quantitative insights. It provides as explanation for …rm investments in general skills that draws on the insight of Lazear (2009) and is complementary to the story told there. It also suggests that nonconvexities arise naturally in a model of multiple skills and that these nonconvexities can create settings in which credit constraints a¤ect behavior even though they are not binding in equilibrium.
When extended to a continuous time setting, our model is tractable and suggests that large shocks, even if positive on net, can have long-lasting adverse e¤ects on even relatively young workers. While a full treatment of the e¤ect of trade deals which raise the price of some skills and lower others would require us to model complementarities among skills more fully and to consider building mobility costs into the simulation, our example should make us think very carefully about the winners and losers and perhaps even the political economy issues.
Since Ricardo, arguments for trade and technological innovation have relied on compensating transfers. But our model suggests two additional considerations. First, losers may be di¢ cult to detect. Losers include a) workers who continue using similar skills but the value of those skills has declined, b) workers who are able to shift to jobs whose value has not been greatly altered but whose value is less than that of the job the worker would otherwise have held, and c) even some workers who eventually shift to jobs that place a relatively high weight on the skills that have increased in value. Moreover, our analysis suggests that the importance of credit constraints for limiting transitions to better jobs may be hidden because workers may be unable to a¤ord to acquire the optimal set of new skills even though they do not appear to be credit constrained. While it may be optimal for some workers to continue to work in jobs that have declined in value, other workers may cling to such jobs because they cannot a¤ord retraining. For workers to adjust more adequately to skill-biased technical and trade shocks, transfer and retraining policies may have to start as soon as foresight permits.
A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From Fiacco (1976) , we have that J is di¤erentiable with respect to S. Taking a derivative of (15) with respect to S i , we have [0; :::0; A i ; 0; :::; 0]
Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to S i , we obtain
Premultiplying (46) with @J @S i
T and using that fact, we have
As S >> 0, rF (J ) > 0 and therefore by assumption r 2 F (J ) is positive de…nite; thus, the right hand side term is positive as a quadratic form on a positive de…nite matrix and we have
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting for J 1 using (19) in (18) and (20) we have
and also, substituting in the block Hessian:
From (49), S i > 0 implies that
From this and the assumption that J i = 0 )
C(I ) > 0; but as we've assumed that rC(0) = 0 and that C is additively separable , it must be that I i > 0 to satisfy
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Di¤erentiating (49) and (50) 
Premultiplying (52) with (
T r 2 C(I )A 1 and recalling r 2 C is diagonal, we get
As
is the Schur complement of the (negative semi-de…nite)
Hessian with respect to the (negative de…nite) block r 2 C, it is negative semi-de…nite.
Therefore, as the negative of a quadratic form on a negative semi-de…nite matrix, the right hand side of (55) a whole is nonnegative; thus proving the proposition.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose I is a solution to the problem with discount and I 0 is one with 0 . Then, optimality implies
so that, after some manipulation
Now, supposing C(I ) = C(I 0 ) for contradiction, we have V ( S + I ) = V ( S + I 0 ) or else one of the objective functions is improvable. Then, from the …rst order condition for I 0 we have 0 rV ( S + I 0 ) = rC(I 0 ) and thus rV ( S + I 0 ) >> rC(I 0 ). This means that I 0 also achieves the supposed maximum in the problem, but with positive …rst derivatives in the maximizers and therefore I is not a maximizer. Hence, it must be the case that
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. From (32) and (27) we have that global maximizers must satisfy
Suppose the global maximum is ; then for any global maximizer I ,
and thus from (61)
As ( 1)( 1) 1, the leftmost component is strictly decreasing in I i for each i and therefore injective. Thus two global maximizers with the same total investment costs P j I j are identical. Suppose now that two global maximizers I and I 0 exist, and P j I j < P j I 0 j ; then from the strict decreasing nature of the left-most term, for each i we have I i > I 0 i : But this contradicts P j I j < P j I 0 j . Therefore the global maximizer I is unique.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Suppose ( 1)( 1) > 1, = I and J 0i (S)=J 0j (S) > J 1i (0)=J 1j (0). First, we …nd J 1 (0) from the FOC:
and then
From this, J 0i (S)=J 0j (S) > J 1i (0)=J 1j (0) and the job FOC we have
Now, as the solution for S >> 0 is interior, recall from (32)
so that using (66) we obtain
I i S i
( 1)( 1)
But given that ( 1)( 1) > 1, the expression x ( 1)( 1) + x 1 ( 1)( 1) is necessarily strictly decreasing in x; therefore (69) implies
which, after rearrangement and division by (
which we know to be true; therefore, the unconstrained problem yields strictly higher utility.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Step 1: J is not optimal in period 1 in the absence of a mobility cost.
The contract maximizes
As the worker does not move, we have
From the fact the worker would move absent the mobility cost, we have
Thus S and S + I W (I F ) are not parallel. Then from J solving rF (J) k A(S + S + I W (I F )) uniquely on F (J) = 0, we have that rF (J) 6 k A( S + I W (I F )). And therefore
Step 2: No skill is underinvested in, and at least one is overinvested in. Given I F , the worker chooses I W to maximize
which given the diagonal forms assumption and the exogeneity of I F is the same problem as 
As ( 1) 
If for all i we have I W i (I F ) I i (J) then J ( S + I (J)) J and therefore either J is in the interior of J and therefore a job where the worker is more productive both periods exists (a contradiction) or J is optimal in the second period in the absence of a moving cost, not the case by Step 1. Therefore there is an i for which I Step 3: Every skill is overinvested in. Now suppose 9i : I and, as I F is part of an optimal contract, so is I F (albeit with a compensating period-0 wage).
We will consider increasingÎ F i to e¤ect an increase in V and through it will implement a decrease inÎ F j without a¤ecting ( I k ) k6 2fi;jg .
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We de…ne the auxiliary functionÎ ) and is ex hypothesi maximized atÎ 
But by assumption I 
